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ABSTRACT
FAIR RATES AND RATES OF RETURN
IN A DEREGULATED RAIL INDUSTRY
This paper addresses the question of whether "fair" rates to captive shippers
are compatible with "fair" rates of return for the railroads in the period of
quasi deregulation since the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. This
question is analyzed by developing a simple model of "polar" Ramsey pricing in
which a public utility faces a break- even constraint while selling in two
sectors: a competitive one in which price equals marginal cost; and a captive
one, which has to bear the entire revenue burden. Under these circumstances,
the markup in the captive sector can be shown to depend on the degree of
economies of scale and the marginal -cost revenue shares in the captive and
competitive sectors. Using the results of a translog cost function based on
panel data of Class I railroads through 1974 - 1986, the paper shows that
returns to scale are sufficiently large to cause coal rates to rise to
socially unacceptable levels if captive coal shippers have to bear the entire
revenue burden. Since, however, railroads currently earn a substantial markup
over marginal costs on manufactured goods, the two goals should be compatible
for most railroads under prevailing competitive relationships between the rail
and the trucking industry.
FAIR RATES AND RATES OF RETURN
IN A DEREGULATED RAIL INDUSTRY
Ann F. Friedlaender
1. Introduction and Overview
Ever since the passage of the Staggers Act of 1980, there has been
substantial controversy over the extent and nature of the regulation of rates on
coal and other captive traffic that do not have ready access to other modes of
transport or other sources of supply. The basis of this controversy lies pri-
marily in the contradictory provisions of the Staggers Act of 1980, which on the
one hand call for "revenue adequacy" to permit the railroads to earn a fair rate
of return on their capital, while on the other hand require that shippers receive
protection in markets in which railroads exhibit market dominance . -"^
Under current practices followed by the Interstate Commerce Conmiission
(ICC) , this protection is rather minimal and is effectively limited to a rate
ceiling based on the stand-alone costs of the rail service provided to the cap-
tive shipper.^ In response to this stance of the ICC, a vigorous consumer group
has developed in recent years, lobbying strongly to reintroduce regulation and
to set an effective rate ceiling on shipments to captive shippers.'^
In assessing the correct policy to follow with respect to the establish-
ment of rate ceilings on any rail shipments, there are four major issues to
assess: first, the degree of scale economies that the railroads experience;
second, the degree to which the railroads are subject to strong competitive
pressures; three, the nature of scale economies and competitive pressures in the
short-run and in the long-run; and four, the ease with which the transition from
a short-run to a long-run equilibrium can occur.
To assess the significance of these issues, it is useful to consider two
2alternative scenarios - one pessimistic and the other optimistic. Under the
pessimistic scenario, the railroads are not only characterized by significant
returns to scale in the short -run, but also in the long-run when they have made
optimal adjustments in their capital stock. In addition, much of their traffic
is subject to strong competitive pressures, which grow over time as truck com-
petition becomes stronger (e.g. double bottoms are permitted over the interstate
highway system) and "captive" utilities develop alternative sources of supply.
In this case, the contradiction between revenue adequacy and equitable
rates on the remaining captive shippers is apparent. With marked economies of
scale, marginal cost pricing yields a large revenue short-fall and the "captive"
base may be too small to provide sufficient revenues to permit the railroads to
earn a fair rate of return at markups that are considered equitable.*
Under the optimistic scenario, any existing marked economies of scale are
essentially viewed as a short-run phenomenon arising from the inefficient capital
stock imposed upon the railroads by regulation. When the railroads have a chance
to adjust their capital stock and their networks to optimal levels, economies of
scale become much more muted, if not actually disappear. Moreover, through the
economies obtained by achieving efficient utilization of capital, labor, and the
network, rail costs are lower than truck costs for a wide range of truck- competi-
tive traffic (e.g. finished autos and auto parts, steel and metal products, etc.)
so that railroads can earn some markup on much of their competitive traffic.
Thus even though the share of captive traffic may be quite small, the revenue
burden placed upon it should also be relatively small. Consequently under this
scenario, workable competition should be possible, and the basic policy problem
is a transitional one of moving from a short-run quasi -regulated equilibrium
characterized by a high degree of economies of scale to a long-run equilibrium
3characterized by modest scale economies and workable competition.^
To analyze these questions, in Section 2 this paper develops a simple
model to show the relationship between the degree of economies of scale, the
share of competitive traffic, and the revenue burden that must be borne by the
captive sector to ensure revenue adequacy. In Section 3 it then assesses the
nature of returns to scale in the rail industry in the previously regulated and
the current quasi regulated environment. Section 4 considers the actual behavior
of rates during the sample period and addresses the question of whether it is
possible for the railroad to have a rate structure that would be viewed as "equi-
table" while ensuring revenue adequacy. Section 5 presents a brief summary and
discusses the policy implications of the findings.
2 . Revenue Burdens in a Stylized Two -Sector Public Utility
To analyze the revenue burden that could accrue to captive coal shippers,
it is useful to consider a stylized public utility operating under a break- even
constraint and consisting of a "competitive" and a "captive" sector.*
In the first sector, competitive forces keep prices close to or equal to
marginal cost, implying that the revenue requirements needed to meet the break-
even constraint must be predominantly generated by the captive sector. The prob-
lem at hand is to see under what conditions a Ramsey rate structure will generate
prices that are consistent with general notions of equity. Consider a firm with
economies of scale equal to r defined as:^
_
C(X-|^,X2)
_
(7(Xj^, X2) /i\
xiac/axi + X2ac/5x2 ~IImIx~~
where ^^ = dC/d'x.^. Define R as the revenue that would accrue to the firm if it
4followed marginal cost pricing so that R = S /iiX^. Thus
rR(xi, X2) = C(xi, X2) .
Suppose the firm operates under a break- even constraint so that instead of
charging /z^, it charges p^ for each output, where p^ = A^/x^ and satisfies the
following:
I PiXi = C(xi, X2). C2)
This implies, however, that
rR = IPiX,. (3)
Solving for r yields the following expression:
(4)
r = E Ai7i
1
where A^ = p^Z/i^ , the price-marginal revenue cost markup that satisfies the break-
even constraint in sector i; and 7^ = /i^x^/R , the marginal cost revenue share in
sector i. From this it is straightforword to obtain the following expression for
the markup in the captive sector that is needed to satisfy the break- even
constraint:
A2 = q^ (5)
where 7 and (I-7) respectively represent the marginal -cost revenue share in the
competitive and captive sectors.
If the regulators maximized welfare subject to a break- even constraint,
the following Ramsey markups would obtain:
Ai = 1/(1 + e/e,) (6)
where
€^ represents the elasticity of demand in the ith sector and 6 represents
a constant reflecting the severity of the break-even constraint. Instead of
solving explicitly for the Ramsey markups,® let us assume that the captive
sector must bear the full burden of the break-even constraint and consider the
polar case in which the "competitive" sector is characterized by perfect com-
petition so that £i = -» and A^ = 1 . In this case eq (5) indicates that the
markup in the captive sector required to satisfy the break- even constraint is
independent of the elasticity of demand in that sector. Thus in this polar case,
the Ramsey rate structure can also be expressed in terms of a cost-based rate
structure unrelated to the elasticity of demand.
This polar Ramsey markup is positively related to the measured returns to
scale and the share of competitive traffic. This makes intuitive sense, since
the larger the returns to scale, the greater the revenue deficit caused by mar-
ginal cost pricing; and the larger the competitive sector, the greater the burden
that must be placed on the captive sector to recoup the revenue deficit. This
can be seen in Table 1, which shows the value of A2 for different values of r and
When the returns to scale are quite low (e.g.
,
r < 1.2) and when the share
of captive traffic is relatively large (e.g., I-7 > 25%), the revenue burden on
the captive sector is relatively low and consistent with generally held views of
equity. If, however, returns to scale are relatively high (e.g.
,
r > 1.5) or the
share of captive traffic is relatively small (e.g.
,
I-7 < 25%) the revenue burden
Table 1
Required markups over
marginal cost in captive sector,
by measured returns to scale
and traffic share in competitive sector.
Required Markup .
in Captive Sector
Required Markup
in Captive Sector
r - 1.05 r - 1.1 r - 1.2
7 7 7
.5 .75 .9 .5 .75 .9 .5 .75 ^
1.1 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.8 3.0
r -= 1.5 r = 1.8 r = 2.0
7 7 7
.5 .75 .9 .5 .75 .9 .5 .75 .9
2.0 3.0 4.0 2.6 4 . 04 9.0 3.0 5.0 11.0
placed on the captive shippers could reach levels that would not necessarily be
thought of as distributionally acceptable. Thus in the presence of marked eco-
nomies of scale and a small captive sector, it may not be possible to obtain both
revenue adequacy and an equitable revenue burden for captive shippers.
More generally, of course, the relationship between economies of scale,
the share of the competitive sector, and the Ramsey markups is given by equation
(5). Since X^ = 1 in the presence of perfect competition, this indicates that
the maximum Ramsey markup in the captive sector should be set by the polar case.
Thus if in the polar case of perfect competition in the competitive sector, the
values of r and Aj are such that the Ramsey markup will be socially acceptable,
they should be also socially acceptable in the presence of finite elasticities
in the competitive sector. Consequently, for policy purposes, it is useful to
analyze the polar case first to see if the polar Ramsey markups will violate
normally held views of equity. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
equation (5) provides a general expression for the markups in the two sectors
that would ensure revenue adequacy.
3. Returns to Scale and Capital Adiustments
In assessing the quasi -regulated rate structure that currently exists and
its potential fully deregulated counterpart, it is important to note that dis-
tributional considerations have not only traditionally played a major role in
regulatory policy, but will also continue to be relevant. Existing shippers, who
made decisions concerning plant locations on the basis of a set of regulatory
rules and a given railroad equilibrium, certainly have some justification in ar-
guing that they should not have to bear the full burden of moving to another
equilibrium based on a different set of regulatory rules. Moreover, if there are
substantial efficiency costs associated with the maintenance of the status quo,
efforts should also be made to encourage the railroads to reach a new efficient
equilibrium as speedily as possible and to find appropriate ways to compensate
the adversely affected shippers. Thus in addition to the generally accepted no-
tions of static second-best efficiency, we must also consider issues related to
dynamic efficiency or how the transition can best be made from one equilibrium
to another.'
Let us therefore begin by assessing the available evidence concerning the
8regulated and the quasi -regulated structure of rail technology and the transi-
tional path from a regulated equilibriiim to the quasi -regulated equilibrivun. We
will then consider alternative pricing policies in the light of this evidence.
3 . 1 The Analysis of Costs and Technology
The estimated returns to scale used in this paper are based on Berndt et
al. (1990), which estimates a cost function using a time-series, cross section
of the major class I railroads for the period 1974-1986. '•° Thus this data set
provides a picture of the technological structure of the railroads during the re-
cent period when regulation existed and when it has been substantially reduced.
Consequently by estimating the returns to scale over the sample period for repre-
sentative railroads, it should not only be possible to analyze the appropriate
rate structure to adopt during the period immediately following deregulation, but
also the rate structure that would be appropriate in a long-run equilibrium when
the railroads are able to adjust their capital stock in an optimal fashion. ^^
Because of our interest in coal rates, we will analyze the behavior of the
five railroads that are heavy coal carriers (Burlington Northern, Conrail, CSX
System, Norfolk Southern System, and the Denver Rio Grande). In addition, be-
cause of the number of significant mergers that have taken place during the past
decade, it is also useful to focus on the merged rail systems (the four large
coal systems, plus the Union Pacific System) to see if they have behaved differ-
ently from the other railroads. ^^ Finally, for purpose of comparison, we will
consider the behavior of a number of representative non-coal, non-merged
systems: the Atchison, Topeka and the Santa Fe (a large Western road); the
Illinois, Central Gulf (a large Southern road); the Grand Trunk Western (a small
Eastern road) ; the Missouri Kansas Texas (a small Western road) ; and the Soo (a
9small Western road)^^
Berndt et al
.
(1990) estimate a translog approximation of a short-run
variable cost function of the following general form:
(7)
C^ = C = (y, w, xp, t)
where C^ represents variable costs, ^'' y represents total ton-miles, w represents
a vector of prices for variable inputs (labor, equipment, fuel, and "other"), Xp
represents way and structures (ws) capital, and t represents a vector of techno-
logical variables (miles of track, average length of haul, agricultural tonnage
as a proportion of total tonnage, coal tonnage as a proportion of total tonnage,
a time trend, and dummy variables to represent time since merger and time since
deregulation) . Although this specification uses an aggregate output variable of
ton-miles, costs are permitted to vary with the composition of tonnage carried
among agricultural goods, coal, and "other" commodities- -primarily manufactured
goods
.
Because of the likelihood that there are firm-specific effects that are
not fully captured in the available data (e.g. the rail network), it is useful
to introduce dummy variables to reflect these firm-specific characteristics.
Consequently, in estimating equation (7), firm-specific dummy variables were
added to the intercept of the cost function and the linear terms of the input
price variables. This procedure assumes, in effect, that firm-specific differ-
ences in technology consist of a "neutral" component and an input -specific
component, but are independent of the firms' output, ws capital, and techno-
logical characteristics.^^
Since the sample period included a substantial number of years in which rate
10
regulation was significantly reduced, it is likely that output and its related
technological variables (ALH, % coal, % agriculture) are endogenous to the firm,
rather than exogenous. Consequently, the cost function and its associated input
share equations were estimated by a 3SLS procedure that assumed that the follow-
ing variables and their transformations were endogenous: output, average length
of haul, the proportion of coal traffic, and the proportion of agricultural
traffic.^*
Because of the importance of determining revenue adequacy for the rail-
roads, it is important to evaluate different measures of returns to scale and to
consider explicitly how measures of scale economies are related to the way in
which output can change. In this paper, we follow most analyses of transport
cost functions, and define output as ton-miles so that y = TH, where y = ton-
miles; T = tons shipped; and H = average length of haul. Although a given per-
centage increase in tons or average length of haul will have an identical impact
on ton-miles, in this specification it will not have the same impact upon costs,
since average length of haul and the composition of output also enter as
technological characteristics in the cost function.
The importance of this can be seen by considering the specified cost
function, C = C(y(H,T), H, t^, , t^)
,
where t^. and t^ respectively represent the
share of total tonnage accounted for by coal and agriculture ( i.e.,
tj = Tg /T and tg = Tg/T) and the other arguments are supressed for convenience.
Taking the total differential of costs yields the following expression
where e^-y, e^, e^.^ and e^. represent the partial elasticity of cost with respect
to the relevant argument (e.g., e^-y = 91nC/ainy) .
11
dC
_
.
_
_
V dT . X dH
—Q- ~ '®cy ®cpc ^cpa'-nn- '*' V^cy "*" ^cH' -rr
dT, dT, ^^^
^CpC~!Ti— *^cpa~T'
c a
If all tonnage changes proportionately, (i.e. dT/T = dT^/T^ = ATJT^), the
elasticity of costs with respect to tons is simply given by the partial
elasticity of cost with respect to output, i.e.,
i^.I-E^,, = e, -4l£2 (9)
Similarly, if total tonnage and its components remain constant and average length
of haul changes , the relevant elasticity of cost is given by
dC.H^r.
_/^ .o^= 51nC ^ 51nC ^^°^
an c ~ ^^« ^ ^^=y ^'^' ~ -wn^ thh
More generally, by dividing the expression given in eq (8) by the percentage
change in ton-miles, we can obtain the following expression for the total
elasticity of costs with respect to output:
dC v '" <^^>
-^•^ = QtEcT + "hEcH + "cecpc + "a ^cpa
where e^pa and e^^^. respectively represent the partial elasticity of cost with
respect to the percentage of agriculture and coal traffic and a^, a^, a^ and q^
respectively represent the percentage change of the output component relative to
the percentage change in total ton-miles (e.g., Qj = (dT/T)/(dY/Y)) . In
addition, Ech is defined as above (eq (10)) and Ed = Ecy - ecpc - e^pa. Finally,
if all components of output change proportionately, this simplifies to the
following expression: ^^
12
-^•^lprp-E;:p = ecy ^ -SecH
Returns to scale are simply given by the reciprocal of the elasticity of
cost. We thus define the following measures of returns to scale:
Tons: Sy^ = E^j'^ (13a)
ALH: SyH = E^h"' (13b)
Weighted: Syj, = F^-^ (13c)
Proportional: Syp = Ecp"-^ (13d)
A priori . it is not obvious which of these measures is the most relevant.
The returns to scale with respect to tons reflects the conventional measure of
scale economies when ton-miles is the output measure and also reflects the usual
measure of economies of density. ^^ Moreover, since the composition of output
is assumed to remain constant, this is analogous the the familiar measure of ray
economies of scale. Since, however, tonnage increases proportionately, while
average length of haul remains constant, this measure does not reflect a full
proportionate increase in all of the components of output. This is given by the
measure of proportionate returns to scale. Although this measure has a certain
logic, it is important to note that it will magnify the measured economies of
density, since a proportionate increase in tonnage and average length of haul
will lead to a two -fold increase in the output measure, ton-miles.
This suggests that the most useful measure of returns to scale may be
given by the measure of weighted returns to scale, which reflects the actual
changes in the various components of output that have occurred over the sample
period. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this measure may be highly
volatile, since it is heavily dependent on the changes in each component of out-
13
put relative to the change in ton-miles. On balance, this indicates that the
preferable measure of returns to scale is the one that is conventionally used,
i.e. , returns to scale with respect to tons or ton-miles. Since this assumes that
the composition of traffic remains constant, it can also be thought of as a mea-
sure of ray economies of scale with respect to tons.
To date, we have not differentiated between short-run and long-run eco-
nomies of scale. Because of the large amounts of fixed capital embodied in the
railroads' way and structure, it is important to consider the relationship be-
tween short-run and long-run returns to scale and the relationship between the
opportunity cost of capital and the firm's shadow value of capital. The formal
relationships between short-run scale economies, the shadow value of capital, and
long-run returns to scale can be seen by considering the following total cost
function:
C^ = C=(y, w, t, 5^) + p* Xp (1-^)
where C^ represents total costs, p* represents the opportunity cost of capi-
tal,^' and the other variables have their previous meaning.
By differentiating equation (14) with respect to ws capital (xp)
,
it is
straightforward to show that the equilibrium capital stock is obtained when the
opportunity cost of capital equals the firm's shadow value of capital, which is
defined as the savings that would accrue to variable costs if the stock of ws
capital were raised incrementally. Thus:
acS(y,w,t,5^+)
^ _ ^^3^
axp*
14
To obtain the optimal stock of capital we solve eq (15) for Xp* . Long run
costs are obtained by substituting Xp* into the cost function given in eq (14).
Long run returns to scale are then given by the reciprocal of the relevant long-
run elasticity of cost with respect to output. Thus the long-run returns to scale
are defined in the same way as the short-run returns to scale, with the optimal
capital stock being substituted for the actual capital stock in calculating the
long-run scale economies. ^°
3.2. Elasticities of Size and of Scale
As the previous discussion of a "polar" Ramsey world indicates, the abil-
ity of a railroad to earn a "fair" rate of return while charging a "fair" rate
to its captive shippers primarily depends upon the nature of the size related
economies facing the railroad. Table 2 presents estimates of the short-run and
long-run returns to scale and their associated standard errors, for the following
measures: Tons, which represents the usual measure of economies of density (eq
(13a)); Proportional, which represents a proportional change in all of the com-
ponents of output (eq (13c)); and Weighted, which incorporates the observed
changes in all of the components of output (eq. (13d) )^-^ Although some standard
errors are large relative to the parameter estimates , they indicate that the
scale economies are estimated with an acceptable degree of precision. In gen-
eral, there appears to be substantially more variation among different measures
of returns to scale than between the short-run and long-run relationships for any
given measure of returns to scale or between the railroads for any given measure
of returns to scale.
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The short run returns to an increase in tons or ton-miles are generally
quite large. In most cases they are greater than one at accepted level of statis-
tical significance, and in many cases, they are substantially greater than one.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that there appears to be little difference
in the returns to scale between the coal and the non coal roads. Since the lat-
ter railroads have relatively fewer captive shippers than the coal roads , this
suggests that they may have even greater difficulty in obtaining fair rates of
return than the coal roads.
The long run returns to scale are generally somewhat larger than the short
run returns to scale, ^^ and in some cases are substantially greater, suggesting
that the observed economies of scale may not be a transitional problem due to a
disequilibrium in the capital stock, but may represent an innate technological
characteristic of the railroad industry. ^^
The measures of proportional returns to scale are substantially larger than
those for tonnage -related scale economies.^'' As discussed above, this is to be
expected, since a proportional increase in tons and average length of haul in-
creases ton-miles by a factor of two. For a given network, this increases the
density of its usage concomitantly. As was true in the previous case, long-run
returns to scale are tj^ically greater than short-run returns, indicating that
substantial returns to scale may be an inherent structural characteristic of the
industry.
Clearly, however, the various components of output do not move propor-
tionately, and the measure of weighted scale economies is more variable than the
other measures of returns to scale. The short-run weighted returns to scale
measure the returns to scale actually experienced by the railroads during the
sample period. ^^ These are generally qualitatively similar to the other
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measures, although there are a few exceptions. For example, Conrail appears to
have experienced periods of decreasing returns to scale, while the Seaboard Sys-
tem appears to have operated under conditions approximating constant returns
before its merger with the Chessie system to form the CSX.
In spite of a few instances of decreasing or constant returns under the
weighted scale economies , the evidence in Table 2 generally indicates that the
railroads not only operate under substantial returns to scale under current capi-
tal structures, but that they will continue to do so if capital is adjusted in
an optimal fashion. This, of course, may create a problem for policy if the
markups required to ensure revenue adequacy or fair rates of return are greater
than those deemed to be socially acceptable. This is the topic to which we now
turn.
4. Policy Implications and Efficient Coal Rates
It is now useful to bring the threads of the previous two sections to-
gether and analyze their implications for the railroad rate structure. In Sec-
tion 2 we developed a simple model relating the Ramsey rate structure to the
markups over marginal cost that would be required to permit the railroads to
break even. We showed that in the limiting case when captive traffic bore the
entire revenue burden, the markup would be independent of the elasticity of de-
mand in the captive sector, but would depend entirely on the returns to scale for
a given railroad and the revenue share of the captive traffic under a competitive
pricing regime. Section 3 then assessed the available evidence concerning eco-
nomies of scale during the sample period.
In this Section we address the question of efficient coal rates. We first
discuss the changes in coal rates relative to changes in other rates during the
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sample period and then consider the relationship between prices and marginal
costs that occurred during the sample period. We then turn to the rates that
would be required in the captive sector if it were required to bear the entire
revenue burden and assess whether "fair" rates are compatible with a "fair" rate
of return.
4. 1 The Behavior of Coal Rates
Table 3 presents the percentage change in revenues per ton (in current
dollars) for the coal roads and the non-coal roads for five periods: the sample
period 1974-86; the period prior to deregulation (1974-79); the period post de-
regulation (1979-86) ; and the subset of the period of deregulation from 1979-1984
and from 1984 to 1986.^* This indicates that over the sample period, most rail-
roads experienced substantially greater increases in coal rates than on other
tjrpes of commodities. However, this differential rate increase was not uniform
over the sample period among commodity types or among railroads. For example,
during the period of major energy price increases, between 1974 and 1979, coal
rates rose relatively more with respect to manufactured goods than they did with
respect to agricultural goods. In contrast during the period of deregulation
(1979-1986), the opposite happened with coal rates generally rising relatively
more with respect to agricultural goods than manufactured goods. It is important
to note, however, that the behavior of rates in the period of deregulation has
not been uniform, with rates generally rising substantially more during the
period 1979-84 than the period 1984-86. Moreover, during this latter period,
coal rates have generally fallen relative to rates on manufactured and other
goods
.
It is interesting to note that there do not appear to be significant
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN RATES, BY RAILROAD,
SELECTED YEARS
COAL RAILROADS
AGRIC COAL OTHER TOTAL REV/TONMI
bn
1974-86 85.563 149.777 145.763 88.337 26.946
1974-79 76.752 74.107 56.331 44.342 17.365
1979-86 4.985 43.462 57.207 30.480 8.163
1979-84 21.92 65.51 41.20 35.04 16.33
1984-86 -13.89 -13.32 11.34 -3.38 -7.02
drg
1974-84 174.24 282.64 191.81 163.88 72.56
1974-79 57.48 99.17 41.81 39.92 38.41
1979-84 74.14 92.12 105.78 88.59 24.67
conrail
1979-86 174.24 282.64 191.81 163.88 72.56
1979-84 57.48 99.17 41.81 39.92 38.41
1984-86 74.14 92.12 105.78 88.59 24.67
sea/CSX
1974-86 130.23 185.21 166.73 145.86 24.00
1974-79 46.68 73.93 44.83 47.20 51.43
1979-86 56.96 63.98 84.17 67.02 -18.11
1979-84 49.83 84.79 75.49 61.70 31.70
1984-86 4.76 -11.26 4.95 3.29 -37.82
ches/csx
1974-86 124.64 103.05 106.44 117.19 6.37
1974-79 37.12 56.23 64.68 56.72 58.82
1979-86 63.83 29.96 25.36 38.59 -33.02
1979-84 56.38 46.45 19.45 34.17 7.72
1984-86 4.76 -11.26 4.95 3.29 -37.82
nw/nss
1974-86 56.47 108.84 103.94 101.17 100.00
1974-79 52.21 67.35 60.10 57.19 51.89
1979-86 2.80 0.77 3.12 0.00 -0.54
1979-84 17.82 23.85 23.52 27.98 32.38
1984-86 -12.75 0.77 3.12 0.00 -0.54
sou/nss
1974-86 45.70 253.17 130.35 109.02 22.55
1974-79 60.64 72.32 56.37 55.11 -14.20
1979-86 -9.30 104.95 47.31 34.76 42.83
1979-84 3.95 103.39 42.85 34.76 43.61
1984-86 -12.75 0.77 3.12 0.00 -0.54
TABLE 3, CONT
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN RATES, BY RAILROAD,
SELECTED YEARS
NON COAL RAILROADS
AGRIC COAL OTHER TOTAL REV/TONMI
mopac/ups
1974-86 203.07 332.83 245.24 181.05 67.63
1974-79 80.58 96.97 60.32 56.09 39.88
1979-86 67.83 119.74 115.35 80.06 19.83
1979-84 52.96 99.49 69.80 55.59 25.62
1984-86 9.72 10.15 26.82 15.73 -4.61
up/ups
1974-86 69.04 96.56 106.65 69.75 64.77
1974-79 52.08 76.83 46.32 42.78 28.41
1979-86 11.16 11.15 41.23 18.89 28.32
1979-84 1.31 0.91 11.36 2.74 34.51
1984-86 9.72 10.15 26.82 15.73 -4.61
atsf
1979-86 26.41 12.25 90.28 43.09 22.35
1979-84 24.10 21.98 60. C3 34.39 23.28
1984-86 1.87 -7.98 18.91 6.48 -0.75
gtw
1974-86 38.72 189.80 123.51 81.34 66.46
1974-79 44.41 90.68 36.40 39.99 27.34
1979-86 -3.94 51.98 63.86 29.53 30.73
1979-84 4.10 119.45 56.11 41.25 21.43
1984-86 -7.73 -30.74 4.97 -8.29 7.65
icg
1974-86 22.26 90.05 96.89 71.64 87.80
1974-79 57.71 64.82 47.42 53.92 33.04
1979-86 -14.33 15.31 33.55 11.52 41.15
1979-84 9.30 41.94 38.19 24.85 38.17
1984-86 -21.62 -18.77 -3.35 -10.68 2.16
mkt
1974-86 87.97 665.64 54.47 59.31 79.21
1974-79 77.42 324.95 36.38 42.69 52.44
1979-86 5.95 80.17 13.26 11.65 17.56
1979-84 18.49 43.87 35.81 23.03 33.23
1984-86 -10.58 25.23 -16.60 -9.25 -11.76
soo
1974-86 58.75 95.61 144.68 92.68 97.97
1974-79 57.12 57.93 45.60 49.66 48.30
1979-86 1.04 23.85 68.06 28.7
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differences with respect to the behavior of rates between the coal and non-coal
roads or among the various coal and non-coal roads. In general the small roads
experienced greater rate increases than the large roads, indicating that they may
have been subject to somewhat less regulatory scrutiny than the larger roads.
In all cases the rate differentials pre and post 1979 are striking, with rate
increases being substantially less post 1979 than during the period of the
1970' s. This is particularly true for agricultural products which exhibited very
modest rate increases for all railroads post 1979. In contrast, rates on coal
and manufactured and other goods rose substantially for most railroads during
this same period, although rail rates increases in coal have slowed substantially
post 1984 and in several cases have actually fallen.
While somewhat sketchy, this evidence suggests that energy price and other
supply shocks rather than deregulation gave the railroads their greatest impetus
to raise coal rates. Indeed, during the period 1974-1979, coal rates rose by
over 75 percent for most railroads, while during the post-Staggers period their
increases were substantially more modest, particularly after 1984. Given the
large amount of economic rents on coal that had been generated by the rapid rise
in oil rates during the 1970 's it is not surprising that coal rates also rose
dramatically. What is somewhat surprising, however, is the relatively modest
rise in coal rates during the post- Staggers period for most railroads, particu-
larly relative to rates on manufactured and other commodities. Here, several
factors were doubtless at work. With respect to coal rates, the drop in energy
prices reduced the potential coal rents and hence the railroads' ability to
appropriate these rents. Thus the energy price drops mitigated the railroads'
ability to exploit their market power with respect to coal.^^ Conversely, how-
ever, the pricing freedom given the railroads by the Staggers Act enabled them
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to raise their rates on manufactured traffic, much of which had been transported
at excessively low rates. Similarly, the rate competition engendered by the
Staggers Act with respect to bulk agricultural commodities caused these rates to
be relatively stable during the post-Staggers period. Thus the post-Staggers
rate pattern involved comparable rate movements for coal and manufactured goods
,
both of which rose relative to agricultural commodities. Given these patterns
of rate changes, it is difficult to argue that the Staggers Act unleashed the
railroads to exploit their latent monopoly power with respect to coal shippers.
Indeed, the evidences suggest that the economic rents associated with coal are
a greater determinant of the railroads' ability to raise coal rates than dereg-
ulation.
This conclusion is strengthened by the evidence in Table 4, which provides
information on the price increases in the general economy. In this connection
it is interesting to note that rail rates on coal closely followed those of all
energy prices throughout the sample period, but that they outstripped increases
in the CPI , the finished goods index, and the farm products index. However, it
should be noted that coal rates rose substantially more than energy prices in the
post-Staggers period, indicating that deregulation did permit the railroads to
exercise some latent market power. In contrast, agricultural rates tended to
trail the non- energy price rises throughout the economy, particularly in the
post-Staggers period. The behavior of manufactured rates was somewhat mixed,
generally following the non- energy price increases in the economy throughout the
1970' s, but generally exceeding them in the post- Staggers period.
Again, this implies that energy prices appear to be the principal deter-
minant of coal rates while the regulatory and general economic environments were
the principal determinants of other rates. In particular during the period of
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regulation, rail rates on agriculture and manufactured goods appear to have fol-
lowed those of other components in the economy. In the post-Staggers period,
however, regulatory freedom and the resulting competition in agricultural commod-
ities pushed agricultural rates down relative to general price increases. In
contrast, the regulatory freedom accorded by the Staggers Act enabled the rail-
roads to raise rates on coal and on manufactured goods, causing their rates to
rise relative to energy prices and those in the non- energy sectors in the post-
Staggers period. Nevertheless, on balance, deregulation seems to have had a
smaller impact on coal rates than it has on agricultural or manufactured rates.
Table 4
Price Indices and Percentage
Change, by Index, 1974-86
CPI Producer Price Index
(1967=100) (1967=100)
Finished Energy: Farm
total (a) Goods :(b) (c) Prod.(c)
1974 147.7 147.5 208.3 177.4
1979 217.4 217.7 408.1 229.8
1984 311.1 291.1 656.8 262.4
1986 328.4 289.7 483.5 251.9
Percent Change
:
74-86 122.3 96.4 132.1 42.0
74-79 47.2 52.8 95.9 29.5
79-86 51.0 33.1 18.5 9.6
79-84 43.1 33.7 60.9 14.2
84-86 5.6 -0.5 -33.2 -4.0
Source:
(a) Economic Report of the President, 1988, p. 313
(b) Economic Report of the President, 1988, p. 319
(c) Economic Report of the President, 1988, p. 322
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4. 2 Coal Rates and Efficient Prices
In terms of policy and considerations of economic efficiency, we are not
so much interested in the behavior of rail rates relative to coal or other com-
modities as in the relationship of coal rates to marginal costs. In particular,
it is now desirable to return to the initial question asked in this paper: name-
ly is a polar Ramsey rate structure consistent with socially acceptable rates?
To answer this, it is useful to consider first the actual relationship
between coal rates and marginal costs that existed over the sample period. We
then turn an analysis of whether it is possible to achieve revenue adequacy while
charging rates that are deemed to bear a politically or socially acceptable re-
lationship to marginal costs.
4.2.1 Price -Marginal Cost Relationships
Table 5 presents the estimated short-run and long-run marginal costs for
coal shipments, their associated standard errors, and the price/marginal cost
markups for coal shipments for the railroads considered in this analysis.^®
Although the standard errors are large relative to the estimated marginal costs
for a few railroads (e.g. , Conrail, the CSX System), marginal costs are generally
estimated with acceptable levels of precision. It is interesting to note that
the long-run marginal costs are almost unifotmly higher than the short-run mar-
ginal costs, indicating that marginal costs would rise substantially if capital
were adjusted in an optimal fashion.^' The marginal costs for the non coal
roads are generally greater than those of the coal roads, with the long run mar-
ginal costs being relatively higher than the short-run marginal costs. Because
these railroads ship relatively small amounts of coal, this is to be expected.
They do not enjoy the economies of high volume and high density experienced by
TABLE 5
MARGINAL COSTS AND PRICE-MARGINAL COST RATIOS
FOR COAL, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
COAL RAILROADS
Year
COAL MARGINAL COST ($/TON)
SHORT RUN LONG RUN
VALUE STD ERR VALUE STD ERR
PRICE/MC RATIOS
SHORT LONG
RUN RUN
bns
mean
74
79
84
86
drg
mean
74
79
84
conrail
mean
79
84
86
seabrd
mean
74
79
chessie
mean
74
79
CSX
mean
84
86
nw
mean
74
79
southern
mean
74
79
nss
mean
84
86
6.36
2.75
6.91
7.53
6.40
4.55
1.99
3.50
8.63
1.15
0.46
0.95
1.20
2.29
1.64
2.74
0.83
0.35
1.00
1.87
1.77
1.51
1.76
0.70
2.04
1,
0.
1,
2,
1,
3,
38
91
39
96
74
95
1.53 8.87
1.62 9.85
1.54 7.80
1.96 10.85
1.65 9.35
0.95 2.80
0.35 1.50
0.68 2.07
2.23 5.07
2.41 4.58
2.31 3.43
2.28 5.18
2.40 4.38
1.25 2.77
0.91 2.53
1.57 3.17
1.08 0.67
0.71 0.37
1.38 0.75
2.03 2.73
2.07 2.29
1.79 2.40
1.09 2.35
0.74 1.77
1.30 2.71
1.14 2.05
0.79 1.63
1.32 2.14
2.05 4.85
2.03 4.23
2.01 4.24
2.18 1.026 0.736
2.34 1.629 0.455
1.65 1.129 1.000
3.91 1.714 1.190
3.02 1.748 1.197
0.73 1.237 2.011
0.35 1.216 1.613
0.53 1.377 2.329
1.49 1.073 1.826
2.24 5.661 1.421
2.26 12.130 1.627
2.19 8.758 1.606
2.16 6.258 1.715
1.33 1.594 1.318
1.05 1.567 1.016
1.64 1.631 1.410
1.05 5.855 7.254
0.71 10.314 9.757
1.13 5.640 7.520
2.30 4.339 2.971
2.29 4.667 3.607
2.09 4.854 3.054
1.27 3.943 2.953
1.32 6.300 2.492
1.54 3.618 2.723
1.23 3.060 2.060
0.88 2.866 1.600
1.44 3.233 2.100
2.63 3.159 1.928
3.04 5.253 2.161
2.05 2.332 2.172
TABLE 5, CONT
MARGINAL COSTS AND PRICE-MARGINAL COST RATIOS
FOR COAL, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
NON COAL RAILROADS
COAL MARGINAL COST ($/TON) PRICE/MC RATIOS
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT LONG
Year VALUE STD ERR VALUE STD ERR RUN RUN
mopac
mean 4.58 1.62 10.05 2.54 0.928 0.423
75 3.21 1.60 11.92 2.92 0.617 0.166
79 4.52 1.60 9.03 2.45 0.863 0.432
up
mean 4.38 2.06 11.21 3.35 1.799 0.703
75 1.54 1.45 8.17 2.41 2.831 0.534
78 3.11 2.05 8.18 2.93 2.479 0.943
ups
mean 5.95 2.38 13.96 4.61 1.311 0.559
84 6.04 2.67 19.00 6.66 1.288 0.409
86 4.70 2.17 8.86 3.13 1.823 0.967
atsf
mean 6.96 2.91 23.30 5.88 0.973 0.210
79 1.33 2.88 32.92 9.02 4.283 0.173
84 7.46 3.13 20.69 6.03 0.931 0.336
86 9.54 2.93 13.70 3.23 0.670 0.467
gtw
mean 1.74 2.20 na na 2.222 na
75 na na na na na na
79 na na na na na na
84 2.21 1.86 na na 2.929 na
86 3.47 1.53 na na 1.292 na
icg
mean 3.27 1.44 5.44 1.43 1.212 0.728
74 1.87 0.84 3.04 0.89 1.233 0.759
79 3.48 1.40 5.43 1.50 1.092 0.700
84 4.21 1.62 6.23 1.63 1.282 0.866
86 1.20 1.75 4.87 1.46 3.653 0.900
mkt
mean 3.33 1.04 5.64 1.30 1.536 0.907
74 na na 12.54 4.51 na 0.080
79 1.96 1.15 1.83 2.98 2.187 2.342
84 5.08 0.93 6.95 1.17 1.214 0.887
86 5.74 1.12 3.87 1.01 1.345 1.996
soo
mean 29.87 17.98 63.45 21.25 0.186 0.092
74 5.11 4.99 19.44 6.48 0.595 0.156
79 14.66 10.71 49.03 14.84 0.328 0.098
84 9.20 16.67 84.77 26.87 0.799 0.087
86 9.09 1.92 9.73 2.02 0.655 0.611
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the coal roads
.
As we would expect, the short-run price/marginal cost relationships exceed
unity for all of the coal roads throughout the sample. While these markups are
relatively low for the Western coal roads, they are substantial for the Eastern
coal roads, with the exception of the Seaboard System prior to merger. It is
interesting to note, however, that there does not appear to be any pattern of
increasing markups in the post-Staggers' period - if anything the markups over
marginal cost are somewhat lower in 1986 than they were in 1974. This is con-
sistent with the previous discussion which indicated that coal rates rose more
in response to the energy shocks of the 1970 's than in response to deregulation.
Thus there does not seem to be any convincing evidence that the railroads are
systematically exploiting their captive coal shippers. In addition, the long-run
price/marginal cost markups are generally quite modest and substantially lower
than the short-run markups. This is something of a statistical artifact, how-
ever, since it assumes that rates and output would remain constant if railroads
adjusted their capital in an optimal fashion.
There is considerable variability among the price/marginal cost relation-
ships on coal shipments within the non coal roads. Although coal rates exceeded
short-run marginal costs for most railroads, the price/marginal cost markup was
below unity in a few instances. In addition, the long-run price/marginal cost
ratios are generally well below unity, reflecting the large differentials between
the estimated short -run and long-run marginal costs. Since prices and outputs
would adjust to long-run marginal costs, this indicates that coal rates would
probably rise significantly on these railroads in long-run equilibrium.
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4.2.2. Polar Ramsey Rates and Revenue Adequacy
We now turn to the basic question asked in this paper: Is there a rate
structure that will permit the railroads to break even and earn a fair rate of
return, while satisfying normally held views of equity about the burden and dis-
tribution of rates? To answer this question, we perform two counterfactual ex-
periments: 1) determine the price/marginal cost markup that would accrue to the
captive coal shippers if they had to bear the entire revenue burden; and 2) im-
pose a socially acceptable predetermined markup on the captive coal sector and
determine the average markup in the competitive sectors that would permit revenue
adequacy
.
Currently, there is no set view on what constitutes a socially acceptable
markup over marginal cost. Historically, the ICC has tended to view rates in ex-
cess of 150 percent of variable costs with suspicion. ^° Although the Staggers
Act stated that rates in excess of 180 percent of variable cost constituted prima
facie evidence of "market dominance" and thus provided shippers with cause to
challenge rates, in recent years the ICC has used a standard of stand-alone cost
in determining rate cases. Since stand-alone costs reflect the costs that would
occur if the railroad dedicated its facilities to the shipments in question and
did not spread its overhead over other shipments, stand-alone costs are typically
quite high. Nevertheless, in view of the statutory language of the Staggers Act
and the political pressures that have been raised by the captive rail shippers,
it is unlikely that public opinion would support rates that are substantially in
excess of three hundred percent of marginal costs. Moreover, in view of the
existing price/marginal cost relationships, a markup of three would signify a
substanial rate increase on coal traffic on average. Thus, while admittedly
arbitrary, we take a price/marginal cost markup of three to signify the limit of
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social acceptablity . However, the qualitative findings of this paper would not
be changed if the limiting socially acceptable markup were set somewhat higher
or lower.
Table 6 presents the polar Ramsey markups for the railroads used in this
analysis based on the tons-related measure of returns to scale, which the pre-
vious analysis indicated provides the most reliable measure of returns to
scale. ^^ With only a few exceptions they are above three, and in most cases
they are substantially higher, in both the short run and the long run. This
indicates that if captive coal traffic had to bear the entire burden of revenue
adequacy, it is unlikely that this could be achieved at a level of coal rates
that would be considered socially acceptable. This raises the more general
question of whether the railroads can be financially viable given the constraints
on rates that are placed by truck competition on the one hand and by social
attitudes toward "excessive" rates on the other.
To examine this question, we perform the counterfactual experiment of
imposing a rate ceiling on coal traffic of three hundred percent of marginal
costs and determine the average markup that would be required on the remaining
traffic to ensure revenue adequacy. This "required" competitive markup is also
given in Table 6 for the ton- related measure of economies of scale. Based on
short-run marginal costs for the coal railroads in the post-Staggers period, this
figure ranges between 1.2 and 2.0. The short-run required competitive markups
for the non coal railroads are somewhat higher, generally ranging between 1.5 and
3.0. This indicates that most railroads could achieve revenue adequacy with a
rate structure that should not be viewed as excessively discriminatory. The long
run competitive markups are not only more variable but are also generally higher
than the short-run competitive markups for both the coal and the non coal roads,
TABLE 6
POLAR RAMSEY MARKUPS, REQUIRED COMPETIVE MARKUPS,
MANUFACTURED PRICE-MARGINAL COST MARKUPS
BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
COAL ROADS
Year
Polar Markup
Short Long
Run Run
Compet Markup Manufac p/mc ratio
Short Long Short Long
Run Run Run Run
bns
mean 4.339 4.078 1.901 29.365 1,437 1.474
74 10.650 na 2.040 na 1.933 2.508
79 3.872 3.820 1.628 2.012 1.717 1.695
84 3.740 na 1.818 na 2.177 2.525
86 3.959 na 1.802 na 2.718 2.931
drg
mean 3.636 4.685 1.758 1.852 2.051 2.744
74 5.202 6.174 2.119 2.008 2.697 2.988
79 3.779 4.816 1.816 1.740 2.448 3.181
84 3.089 4.094 1.184 1.797 1.825 2.643
conrail
mean 20.196 6.602 1.524 1.643 2.802 2.918
79 35.555 7.556 1.395 1.618 3.212 3.807
84 33.914 7.413 1.782 2.019 3.207 3.326
86 20.321 6.762 1.510 1.538 2.986 2.958
seabrd
mean 8.636 7.902 3.173 4.699 na na
74 9.291 7.500 3.324 35.849 na na
79 8.532 7.982 3.067 3.951 na na
chessie
mean 9.679 11.189 1.600 1.566 na na
74 15.952 15.270 1.715 1.724 na na
79 9.356 11.135 1.524 1.469 na na
CSX
mean 10.481 8.758 2.104 3.113 na na
84 11.312 9.858 2.232 2.713 na na
86 21.495 17.045 2.045 2.993 na na
nw
mean 4.452 5.038 1.216 1.643 3.017 3.395
74 1.600 na nb na 4.210 8.659
79 4.018 4.537 1.157 1.472 3.005 3.408
southern
mean 12.675 9.870 1.742 1.939 3.766 4.033
74 14.727 10.102 1.946 2.451 6.247 7.413
79 12.606 9.768 1.680 1.899 3.663 3.922
nss
mean 6.692 6.540 1.605 5.086 3.708 5.887
84 9.798 7.446 1.618 10.402 4.512 10.764
86 6.092 5.996 1.889 2.030 4.305 4.466
na: not available
nb: not binding
TABLE 6, CONTINUED
POLAR RAMSEY MARKUPS, REQUIRED COMPETIVE MARKUPS,
MANUFACTURED PRICE-MARGINAL COST MARKUPS
BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
NON-COAL ROADS
Polar Markup Compet Markup Manufac p/:[tic rati'
Short Long Short Long Short Long
Year Run Run Run Run Run Run
mopac
mean 9.924 na 3.039 na 2.985 3.821
75 14.101 na 2.484 na 2.930 6.248
79 8.943 na 3.226 na 3.215 4.081
up
mean 8.410 5.918 1.575 5.503 1.343 1.475
75 25.170 8.871 1.783 10.773 1.513 1.660
78 10.058 6.677 1.589 3.566 1.594 1.700
ups
mean 6.902 na 2.019 na 2.602 3.953
84 7.477 na 2.021 na 2.208 5.373
86 8.420 na 2.239 na 4.117 4.869
atsf
mean 11.738 5.615 1.766 4.654 1.474 1.795
79 42.544 na 1.814 na 1.510 2.934
84 8.210 na 1.748 na 1.442 1.681
86 5.652 5.070 1.580 2.083 1.601 1.571
gtw
mean 26.541 na 1.645 na 2.730 2.707
75 na na na na 2.871 2.850
79 na na na na 3.493 3.268
84 22.348 na 1.818 na 2.809 2.767
86 8.817 na 1.826 na 4.570 4.822
icg
mean 8.644 6.630 1.995 3.153 2.327 2.513
74 8.746 6.676 2.253 3.861 3.383 3.632
79 8.719 6.905 2.102 3.119 2.154 2.240
84 8.130 6.641 2.041 2.823 2.205 2.289
86 16.696 6.989 1.537 2.623 2.305 2.883
mkt
mean 14.761 10.028 2.661 3.530 1.486 1.522
74 na 14.111 2.871 na 1.618 1.700
79 29.758 31.593 2.428 2.405 1.362 1.364
84 8.619 7.448 2.663 4.581 1.579 1.611
86 9.207 11.814 3.417 2.622 1.405 1.459
soo
mean 20.283 na 4.534 na 1.941 1.998
74 35.125 na 3.907 na 2.508 2.508
79 25.552 na 3.823 na 1.988 2.116
84 61.291 na 3.638 na 1.682 1.851
86 na na na na 2.771 2.780
na: not available
nb: not binding
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in many cases being well in excess of 3.0. This is consistent with our estimates
of large long-run economies of scale and suggests that the current difficulties
facing the railroads concerning revenue adequacy may not be a transitional
problem, but a manifestation of an inherent technological characteristic of rail
technology.
In addition to being socially acceptable, the rate structure must also be
feasible in the presence of strong truck competition. Table 6 also presents the
estimated price/marginal cost markups for manufactured and other commodities,
which are generally greater than the competitive markups that would be required
for revenue adequacy if coal rates were held to a ceiling of three hundred
percent of marginal costs . This suggests that most railroads could achieve
revenue adequacy while sustaining a rate structure that does not place an undue
burden on any class of shippers. It is important to note, however, that this
is not true for all railroads, with the non coal railroads appearing to be more
vunerable than the coal railroads
.
5 . Summary and Conclusion
The implications of the findings of this paper for the ability of the
railroads to achieve revenue adequacy and to earn a "fair" rate of return while
charging "fair" rates are somewhat mixed. On the negative side are two principal
results: 1) railroads appear to operate under substantial returns to scale in
both the short-run and under long-run equilibrium adjustments to their capital
stock; and 2) if captive shippers are forced to bear the entire burden of revenue
adequacy, it is likely that coal rates would have to rise to socially unaccept-
able levels relative to marginal costs. This suggests that there may be
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considerable justification in the recurring concerns of utilities and other
"captive" coal shippers over the level of coal rates.
In spite of these negative findings, the situation is probably not this
bleak, since most railroads typically appear to receive a greater contribution
to overhead from manufactured and other commodities than from coal. Not only are
the estimated price/marginal cost markups for manufactured commodities typically
greater than those on coal, but they are often substantially higher in both the
short -run and the long-run. This indicates that despite the rhetoric of the cap-
tive shippers, the actual revenue burden place upon them probably lies within
politically and socially aceptable levels.
More generally, a comparison of the actual price/marginal cost ratios with
those required to sustain profitability indicates that a significant increase in
rates may not be required. In particular, if we impose a rate ceiling of three
times marginal cost on the captive coal traffic, the markups on the remaining
traffic that are required to sustain a normal rate of return are generally within
the bounds of the actual price/marginal cost markups on manuafactured and other
traffic. Thus although particular railroads may have problems achieving revenue
adequacy and there may be continued pressures to raise rates on captive coal
shippers, on balance it appears that no one type of shipper should be subject to
monopoly "exploitation" to permit the railroads to achieve revenue adequacy.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that this conclusion is heavily dependent
on the finding that the railroads currently enjoy substantial markups on their
truck competitive traffic and do not have to impose the entire burden of revenue
adequacy upon their captive coal shippers. '^^ If trucking costs were to fall
substantially through the introduction of double bottoms, the revenue burden on
captive shippers would increase concomitantly and pressures for reregulation
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could well return.
In conclusion then, the findings of this paper cautiously support the ar-
gument for workable competition in the rail industry under existing cost struc-
tures in the rail and trucking industry In spite of the evidence of substantial
scale economies in both the short-run and in long-run equilibrium, the existing
rate structure and traffic distribution appear to permit consistency between
"fair" rates and "fair" rates of return for most of the railroads considered in
this analysis. Nevertheless, this conclusion is somewhat fragile, since it
depends heavily on the ability of the railroads to continue to earn a significant
contribution to overhead on their truck competitive traffic. Were this ability
to diminish -- either through technical change such as the introduction of double
bottoms or increased competitive pressure from trucks -- the ability of the
railroads to achieve revenue adequacy and an equitable rate structure could well
erode
.
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NOTES
1. The question of the maximum permissible rates on captive traffic has a
somewhat complicated history. Although the Staggers Act indicated that rates
in excess of 180 percent of variable cost constituted prima facie evidence of
market dominance and should therefore be subject to review by the Interstate
Commerce Conmiission (ICC), the ICC has currently adopted guidelines based on
"constrained market power" which are broadly based on Ramsey pricing princi-
ples. In brief, the ICC permits railroads to charge captive shippers a higher
"share of unattributable costs than shippers in competitive markets," (812
Federal Reporter . 2""^ Series, p. 1454) subject to the following four con-
straints: (1) The railroads earn no more than a normal profit and achieve no
more than revenue adequacy; (2) The railroads must operate efficiently so that
shippers cannot be charged for managerial or operating inefficiencies; (3) The
shipper cannot pay more than stand alone costs; (4) The rate cannot be imposed
immediately if it would disrupt the shipper unduly, but instead must be phased
in over time." (812 Federal Reporter . 2""^ Series, p. 1450). In addition, see
Consolidated Rail Corporation vs. United States, 812 F 2""^ 1444 (3"^^ Cir,
1987).
2. Because of the large element of fixed costs and the economies of scope
associated with rail service, it is likely that stand alone costs will be
quite high. See Willig and Baumol (1987) for a defense of the use of stand-
alone costs as a rate ceiling in multi-product markets.
3. Consumers United for Rail Equity (CURE) has emerged as a potent force
lobbying Congress for tighter regulation on coal rates. In 1989 legislation
was narrowly defeated in committee that would have reduced the ability of
railroads to raise rates on all shippers, set an effective ceiling on rates
for captive shippers, and force railroads to give trackage and yard rights to
their competitors. Since then the pressures for reregulation have abated
somewhat
4. It should be noted that we are not so much interested in the question of
whether the railroads are natural monopolies as the question of whether there
is a feasible rate structure that would ensure revenue adequacy while fulfil-
ling generally held views of equity. To determine if railroads were natural
monopolists, we would have to determine if their rate structure was subaddi-
tive (i.e., whether a single railroad could perform the service it produces
more cheaply than a number of separate railroads, each specialized in carrying
a single commodity type) . Because we utilize ton-miles as the relevant output
measure and because data on ton-miles are not available by commodity type, it
is not possible to perform this analysis. However, since track and structures
represent a high proportion of total rail costs and are common to all commodi-
ties carried by a given railroad, it is likely that rail technology is sub-
additive.
5. See Meyer and Tye (1988) for a good discussion of this market equi-
librium.
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6. See Baumol and Bradford (1970) for a discussion of Ramsey pricing in the
case of a public utility operating under a break-even constraint. Recent ar-
guments in favor of the adoption of Ramsey pricing for the railroads are con-
tained in Baumol (1983), Baumol and Willig (1983), Goldfeld (1983), and Willig
(1983). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the case for Ramsey pric-
ing depends on a number of assumptions that are unlikely to be realized. For
instance, in the presence of interdependent demands, intermodal competition,
downstream users (i.e., coal-burning utilities and manufacturing firms), a
non-optimal distribution of income, and price distortions elsewhere in the
economy, the case for Ramsey pricing becomes considerably weaker. For a dis-
cussion of these and related points see Damus (1979), Braeutigam (1979), and
Diamond (1975) .
7. This is the usual definition of ray economies of scale. See Bailey and
Friedlaender (1982) for a discussion of this and other measures of scale eco-
nomies in a multiproduct setting.
8. Equation (6) follows from the familiar Ramsey pricing formula of (p^ -
mCi)/pi = 6/e^. To solve for the Ramsey markups where a degree of monopoly
power exists in each sector, we would substitute the Ramsey markups given in
eq (6) into eq(4) and solve for 6. This yields a quadratic equation in 6,
which is not amenable to a closed form solution.
9. See Meyer and Tye (1985, 1988) for a good discussion of these points.
10. See Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (1981), Brown, Caves and
Christensen (1979), Harmatuck (1979), Friedlaender and Spady (1981) and Caves
et al. (1985) for related work on rail costs.
11. It should be stressed, however, that this is a partial equilibrium
analysis that assumes output levels are fixed at their current levels. To
determine a full equilibrium would require estimates of the demand side of the
market, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
12. See Vellturo (1989) and Berndt et al
.
(1990) for analysis of rail
mergers
.
13. The other railroads included in the sample that were not affected by
merger were: the Chicago Northwest Transit; the Kansas City Southern; the
Missouri Kansas Texas; and the Southern Pacific. The results for these rail-
roads were not reported because they failed to satisfy a sufficient number of
regularity conditions to give an adequate picture of their behavior over the
sample period.
14. Costs and related variables were all measured in 1974 dollars to
abstract from the effects of inflation
15. See Mundlak (1978), Vellturo (1989) and Berndt et al . (1990) for a full
discussion of this point. Most analyses of fixed effects assume that they
affect total costs alone (e.g., Mundlak (1978) and Caves et al
.
(1985). Be-
cause we assume that these effects may be related to factor utilization and
that firms are able to minimize costs with respect to variable factors, we
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introduce them into the linear terms of the factor price expressions within
the cost function. We do not, however, introduce them into the capital stock
terms because we assume that firms are not able to minimize costs with respect
to ws capital.
16. The instruments used were related to firm- specific demand variables and
included mine-mouth coal prices, coal production, oil prices, farm income, and
the value of manufacturing shipments. To test the hypothesis of endogeneity,
whe system of equations was estimated in two ways: first by a 3SLS procedure
that assumed that output and its related variables were endogenous; and sec-
ond, by a maximum liklihood (ML) procedure that assumed that all of the re-
gressors were uncorrelated with the error terms. Under the null hypothesis of
exogeneity ML estimation is effifient, while 3SLS is consistent. If the alter-
native hypothesis of endogeneity is true, only 3SLS is consistent. The y^
statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis that Bssls = ^ml ^^^ 1252.99,
which is much larger than the critical value with 38 degrees of freedom at
any reasonable level of significance. This indicates that output and its re-
lated variables should be treated as endogenous . Hence the cost function and
its associated input share equations were estimated by 3SLS , with demand-re-
lated instruments used for output and its related variables.
17. Since y = H»T, dy/y = dH/H + dT/T. Consequently, if dH/H = dT/T =
dQ/Q, then dy/y = 2dQ/Q.
18. See Keeler (1985) and Caves et.al (1985) for a related discussion of
measures of returns to scale.
19. The opportunity cost of capital for each firm i at time t is defined by
^it = (^it "* "5) , where P^t represents the price index of railroad structures
and capital at time t; r^,. represents the bond rate for railroad i at time t;
and (5 represents the rate of depreciation. See Vellturo (1989 for a full def-
inition of this and related variables.
20. This notion of the long run imputes all of the adjustment to the fixed
factor Xp and keeps output as given. An alternative approach, not considered
here, holds Xp fixed and requires output to change. Since this latter experi-
ment would require some notion of the demand side of the market, it was beyond
the scope of this analysis.
21. We do not present estimates of the returns to scale with respect to
average length of haul. In a preponderance of cases, the absolute value of the
partial elasticity of costs with respect to average length of haul (e^g) was
larger than the partial elasticity of cost with respect to ton-miles, causing
the measured elasticity of cost with respect to average length of haul to be
negative (i.e., Ecjj = e^y + e^H < 0). Thus the resulting measures of these
returns to scale were meaningless.
22. In some cases the size of the optimal capital stock was sufficiently
low to cause the long-run returns to scale to be negative. In that case, we
utilized the symbol "na" in Table 2.
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23. See Friedlaender et al
.
(1990) for a discussion of optimal capital
adjustment of the railroads in the sample.
24. If the scale economies with respect to average length of haul are suf-
ficiently negative, this measure of returns to scale can be negative. When
this occurs, we have written "na" in Table 2.
25. Because some of the relative output changes are quite large and because
some of the partial output elasticities are negative (e.g., average length of
haul, percentage of coal), the weighted cost eleaticity can be negative. When
this occurs, we have written "na" in Table 2. The weights used to calculate
the weighted returns to scale for each year are given as follows: mean (1986-
1974)/1974; 1974 (1979-1974)/1974; 1979 (1984-1979)/1979 ; 1984 (1986-1984)/
1984. Thus there is no measure of weighted returns to scale for 1986.
26. Technically deregulation formally began with the passage of the Stag-
gers Act in 1980. Because administrative deregulation began in 1978 with the
appointment of Darius Gaskins as Chair of the ICC and because of the timing of
the energy shocks, we use 1979 as the base year of deregulation instead of
1980.
27. For analysis of the relationship of coal rates and the economic rents
associated with coal, see Zimmerman (1979) and Atkinson and Kerkvliet (1986).
28. Because data on specific traffic types and rates are given in terms of
tons, it is necessary to estimate marginal costs in terms of tons instead of
ton-miles. Since, however, aggregate ton-miles is simply the product of tons
and average length of haul, the two are obvioulsy related, and it is possible
to estimate the marginal costs per ton for the broad commodity types used in
this analysis. Long run marginal costs can be estimated by substituting
measures of the optimal capital stock in the estimated cost function. It
should be noted that since this formulation assumes that all commodities have
the same average length of haul, marginal costs are doubtless estimated with
some error.
29. Friedlaender et al
.
(1990) have found that during the period of
deregulation, capital has been relatively slow to adjust. Thus the transition
to long-run marginal costs may take some time to occur.
30. See Friedlaender (1969) for a discussion of the ICC's historical
attitudes toward the equitable relationship between rates and variable costs.
31. Marginal cost revenues were obtained from the relationship rR = C,
where r = returns to scale, R = marginal cost revenues, and C = total costs.
Thus for tons -related measure of returns to scale, r, we otain a comparable
measure of marginal cost revenues. The marginal-cost revenue share of the
captive traffic (coal) was thus obtained by taking the ratio of actual mar-
ginal-cost coal revenue to the calculated marginal cost revenues. Using these
data, it was straightforward to calculate the polar Ramsey markup given in eq
(5) for the relevant measure of returns to scale. It should be noted that
these estimates of the polar Ramsey markups are based on a partial equilib-
rium analysis that assumes that output is fixed. Of course, if the polar
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Ramsey markups acutually obtained, output and the resulting measures of scale
economies would doubtless change.
32. Unpublished studies by the ICC and the American Association of Railroads
provide qualitatively similar findings concerning the relationship between
rates and variable costs for manufactured and other commodities.
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